We compare patterns of change in budgetary commitments by countries during periods of democracy and authoritarianism. Previous scholarship has focused almost exclusively on democratic governments, finding evidence of punctuated equilibria. Authoritarian regimes may behave differently, both because they may operate with fewer institutional barriers to choice and because they have fewer incentives to gather and respond to policy-relevant information coming from civil society. By analysing public budgeting in Brazil, Turkey, Malta, and Russia before and after their transitions from or to democracy, we can test punctuated equilibrium theory under a variety of governing conditions. Our goal is to advance the understanding of the causes of budgetary instability by leveraging contextual circumstances to push the theory beyond democracies and assess its broader applicability.
PET (punctuated equilibrium theory) describes how, as a consequence of disproportionate information processing, public policies alternate between long periods of stasis where negative feedback forces maintain the status quo and brief but dramatic periods of change. While the theory accurately describes a broad range of policy activities, studies of PET have looked almost exclusively at Western democracies, where the wide availability of public budgets and other policy indicators facilitate longitudinal analysis. For example, the 2009 article 'A General Empirical Law of Public Budgets' ) focused on only European and North American democracies.
We test PET across different political regimes. First, in the context of authoritarianism and democracy, we analyse public budgeting in Russia from 1998 to 2014, Turkey from 1970 to 2004, and Brazil from 1964 to 2010 -periods including episodes of democracy and nondemocracy in each country. We then look at historical data from Malta during periods of colonial rule by the British (1826 British ( -1921 , colonial self-government (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) , and during a more recent period since that country's 1964 independence.
Democratic and other regimes might differ with regard to budgeting in two opposite ways. On the one hand, autocrats face fewer public and formal checks and balances, possibly allowing them to respond quickly in reaction to shifting contexts; this could be called the 'institutional efficiency' hypothesis. One the other hand, democracies may have higher capacity to gather information about social and other issues because of mechanisms associated with electoral accountability, as well as stronger and more independent civil society organizations including the press; the 'informational advantage' hypothesis.
Under the efficiency hypothesis, an autocrat, working with few institutional constraints such as generating a majority in a democratically elected and independent legislature, should be able to shift spending priorities when advisors recognize the need to do so. This decision-making efficiency would lead us to expect fewer punctuations in regimes where power is concentrated in a decision-making élite who can operate with broad institutional latitude. Institutional and decision-making frictions are lower, so decisions should be more efficient. Indeed, 'making the trains run on time' is one of the main justifications for authoritarian rule, and democracies are often criticized for high decision costs if not deadlock and stalemate.
Democracies have an advantage however when it comes to gathering information: they have many uncensored sources of demands, information, and feedback about the impact of current policies through a more vibrant network of civil society organizations, including political parties staffed by officials anxious to 'feel the pulse' of various constituencies. Furthermore, a bureaucratic network gives democratic leaders the capacity to respond to information once it has been processed. By contrast, authoritarian regimes may be less capable of gathering, processing, and responding to information about societal problems because they have fewer independent sources of information, and indeed they may suppress certain kinds of information or have highly focused policy priorities. Subsequently, we would expect that the magnitude of punctuation in public budgets during periods of authoritarianism would be greater, as governments either fail to gather or ignore signals for longer than would be possible in democracies, only acting when problems grow so large that they threaten the stability of the regime.
Budget data for each country is compiled from various public records and to our knowledge the datasets assembled here are the longest and most accurate publicly available account of budgeting in any of the four countries. Empirical tests are straightforward and designed to distinguish between the two hypotheses. Using Freedom House scores, we classify regimes as either 'Not Free,' 'Partly Free,' or 'Free' for each year of data. Then, for each country, we draw a distribution of budgetary changes corresponding to the different freedom scores. (For Malta, where our data pre-dates the Freedom House scores, we consider the period of self-government as more politically open relative to the period of British colonial rule.) Since our tests are pre-and post-transition within four countries that have experienced changes in forms of government, we effectively control for many other factors including culture, size of the budget, and complexity of the social issues facing the nation.
Evidence strongly supports the information hypothesis, suggesting that any advantage authoritarian regimes gain through institutional efficiency is outweighed by informational constraints. We replicate these findings in the on-line appendix using alternative regimeclassification systems to divide the data, rather than Freedom House. These include Polity IV's assessment of political competition, Unified Democracy Scores (U-Dem), Varieties of Democracy scores (V-Dem), and, finally, by simply using the historical record to identify periods of regime transition. Collectively the results favour the information hypothesis; evidence that our findings using Freedom House scores are robust.
The relative advantage that democratic regimes with a free system of the press and active social mobilizations have with regard to signal detection and problem recognition are poorly understood. Indeed, we know of no budgetary research that systematically compares political regimes with regard to these issues. Our contribution is to develop Punctuated Equilibrium Theory by looking at the impact of institutional forms on patterns of budget reallocations. For all the regimes we examine there is a combination of policy stability and punctuations, implying that the distinction between authoritarianism and democracy (or different forms of democracy) is, in a sense, not fundamental for understanding budget allocations.
1 The levels of punctuation observed differ substantially, however. Theoretically we would expect democracies to have greater informational capacity than other political regimes and this idea finds support in the data.
Indeed, the findings suggest that democratic informational efficiency is more important than non-democratic institutional efficiency. Relative budgetary stability can be added to the long list of attributes that favour democratic governance over its alternatives.
Punctuated equilibrium
Baumgartner and Jones developed PET in 1993 through in-depth case studies of particular policy issues, such as nuclear energy and pesticide use. They found that policy changes in these areas were predominately incremental, but that occasionally radically new ideas would gain momentum causing a tidal shift in government policies toward these issues. In later work (2005) they introduced a more generalized model to demonstrate that government policymaking is a fundamentally erratic process; it is characterized by long periods of equilibrium intermittently punctuated by dramatic changes. Their argument was this: because policymakers are boundedly rational and the processing capacity of political institutions is constrained by rules, governments are disproportionate processors of information. The effects on policy change are two-fold. On one hand, an extreme allegiance to the status quo is built into the system. If attention is scarce, most issues most of the time will be ignored and it is difficult to justify changing the status quo in the absence of attention. But, on the other hand, issues cannot be ignored indefinitely; societal 1 Existing PET scholarship underscores the fact that electoral change is not the only -or even primarydriver of policy change: 'policy changes frequently stem from the emergence of new information or changes in the social or economic environment that are not so simply related to the electoral process' (Baumgartner, Jones and Wilkerson 2011: 948) . That these processes are also found in non-democratic systems should temper any surprise at the distributional similarity of budget allocations across regime types.
problems will grow worse over time and eventually need to be addressed. When an issue finally receives attention, policymakers may be forced to enact dramatic policy changes, if only to catch up for the lack of moderate adjustments they failed to make as the problem slowly developed.
Thus the model describes a system characterized by friction, where negative feedback forces are predominant, but occasionally give way to periods of rapid self-reinforcing change. With policymakers responding only to a limited number of urgent problems at any given time, issues beneath a threshold level of urgency are put on the back burner as attention is focused on the most pressing issues; there are always more issues that deserve attention than time to attend to them.
The implications of the model are that policy changes will fall into one of two categories:
incremental when the status quo prevails, and dramatic during rare periods of imbalance.
Empirical support for this prediction is substantial. A long line of scholarship finds that distributions of changes in public budgets display a punctuated equilibrium pattern, characterized by high central peaks, 'weak shoulders', and very long tails (Baumgartner et.al. [2009] Robinson et.al. [2014] ). This research focuses on kurtosis, a summary statistic that measures the peakedness of a distribution. Higher kurtosis is generally taken as evidence of greater friction in the policy process that produced the given change distribution.
Policymaking in authoritarian regimes
To date, Lam and Chan (2015) and Chan and Zhao (2016) have conducted the only tests of PET in the context of non-democracies (see also Pauw 2007 on South Africa; other tests have been in western democracies). Looking at the case of Hong Kong, Lam and Chan propose that non-democracies are characterized by less friction than democracies because the institutional design of these regimes centralizes power at the highest level of government, and yet, at the same time, the absence of these friction-including institutions also reduces external interferences to political processes. According to them, in the absence of electoral and participative mechanisms that are characteristic of democratic governments, officials lack the same incentives to monitor and respond to the external environment. Within such a system, Lam and Chan argue, under-response or stasis is extended; changes are reduced to prolong stability through mechanisms of negative feedback. However, the authors predict that pressure for change can build up to dangerous levels, especially when it reaches levels high enough to threaten the authority of the regime. The result of the two dynamics is a highly punctuated policy process 'in which the policymaking process is too insulated to react until the built-up pressures can no longer be resisted. But once it happens, the policy response can be radical and extremely forceful' (Lam and Chan 2015: 552) . Chan and Zhao (2016) continue this inquiry, drawing on evidence from the People's Republic of China.
They find that informational restrictions are the main drivers of punctuated equilibrium, and also that there is a negative correlation between the level of punctuation across Chinese regions and the level of labour disputes -a proxy for regime threat. In other words, Chinese policymakers face informational disadvantages when compared to their democratic counterparts, but they become more responsive to signals from society when the regime's existence is threatened.
Of course, much scholarly attention outside of the PET framework has been dedicated to non-democratic governance and these studies help form our hypotheses. In non-democratic systems, without free and fair elections, the durability of the ruling élite is threatened only when problems have grown to such an extent that unrest, either within the regime or society at large, appears imminent. This erodes the informational capacity of authoritarian governments on two Schedler (2013: 37) writes of the 'structural opacity of authoritarian regimes' -that is, the informational uncertainty generated by, among other things, the incentives for citizens not to reveal their sincere preferences for fear of adverse responses from the regime. Second, whatever information is received by policymakers can more easily be ignored -in the short-run, at least. Moreover, even when there is a desire to respond, the necessary bureaucratic capacity may be lacking, as many of the civil institutions through which democracies implement their policies are missing in nondemocratic societies (Tsebelis [2002] ). In particular, democracies may be better at delegation, whereby numerous semi-autonomous bureaucrats work together to promote the social welfare; a level of cooperation that is often impossible for highly centralized regimes.
Another set of institutional features of democracies and authoritarian systems works potentially in another way. The autocrat controls the levers of government; the democratic leader may have to negotiate more compromises. So, whereas democratic leaders may get more signals and be more aware of changing social demands or trends, they may not have the capacity unilaterally to respond. An independent legislature, a judicial body, or members of rival parties sharing control of a coalition government may refuse to cooperate; in sum, a democratic regime typically has some institutional barriers to action, and these are usually much greater than what would exist in an autocracy. 4 To be sure, autocrats are not entirely free from institutional constraints, including intra-élite constraints (Roeder [1993] ; Tsebelis [2002] 
Hypotheses
We propose two competing hypothesis. The first is the 'informational advantage' hypothesis.
5
Every government has a certain threshold of institutional response. Below the threshold policymakers ignore problems; above the threshold they attempt to solve them. Non-democracies 4 Existing PET scholarship shows how much these institutional barriers matter when it comes to policy punctuations. Studies show that kurtosis is substantially higher for outcomes produced at latter stages of the policy process, where the cumulative effect of institutional friction is greatest (Baumgartner etl.al. [2009] ; Jones and Baumgartner [2005] ). 5 Chan and Zhang (2016) make the same point, but write of 'the information disadvantage of authoritarianism', rather than the informational advantage of democracies.
have fewer reliable mechanisms to gather information about societal problems, so the response threshold may be higher than in democracies. Policymakers in authoritarian regimes can ignore problems to the point at which social discontent threatens regime stability. In democracies, problems can be safely ignored only until representatives worry that their constituents will vote them out of office. Voting is much less costly than revolt, so in general we can expect democracies to be more responsive to information. 6 Thus, we hypothesize:
Public budgeting in democracies will show lower levels of kurtosis than other political regimes.
The counter hypothesis is that any information gains provided by democratic institutions are outweighed by the frictions that accompany such institutions. This is the 'institutional efficiency' hypothesis, which suggests that authoritarian leaders may be better situated to act to resolve social issues than their democratic counterparts The institutional efficiency hypothesis thus states:
Public budgeting in autocracies will show lower levels of kurtosis than other political regimes.
Established PET studies seem to provide support to the institutional efficiency hypothesis. There is ample evidence, both within (Jones et al 2003) and across countries , that centralised institutions reduce decision-making costs resulting in less punctuated patterns of policy change. Existing comparative research, however, is mostly focused on democratic regimes. As such, it did not take into account significant variation in another key variable: censoring of information versus leaving it free and open. The existence of widely dispersed sources of information typical of democracies generates a greater ability to respond (Baumgartner and Jones 2015) , and stronger incentives to do so. We can expect the informational advantage of democracy to be greater than the decision-making advantage of authoritarianism. Indeed, many of the elements of governance often portrayed as impediments to efficient decision-making in multiparty democracies featuring separation of powers or the need to placate multiple veto-players actually serve to bring in greater amounts of information to the system. Thus, we expect our empirical tests to show greater levels of efficiency in democracies compared to authoritarian regimes.
We acknowledge that classifying regimes in a binary fashion -as either democratic or authoritarian -can be problematic, given the variety that this masks. In addition, and more broadly, any regime classification exercise is complicated by the persistent disagreements amongst scholars about typologies, measures, and relevant data. Our claim is only that the political freedoms and institutional structures typical of democratic governance affect patterns of budgetary change systematically. Drawing simple distinctions between regimes that are more or less democratic should be sufficient to capture these systematic differences. Building on this foundation, further research could undertake a nuanced exploration of how specific structures across regimes affect public budgets.
Budget Data
Previous scholarship has focused almost exclusively on Western democracies because these countries make longitudinal data readily available. governed principally by data availability; our empirical approach requires budgetary records that cover a regime transition and exist over a sufficiently long period of time to draw statistically meaningful distributions. Few countries fit these requirements and to our knowledge the data we assemble here is the most comprehensive in this regard (excluding the budget data from Hong
Kong that has already been tested by Lam and Chan and data from China that was tested by
Chan and Zang). The analysis gains from the dissimilarities -both geographic and politicalbetween the four countries by allowing a test of the hypotheses under a variety of socio-political circumstances. Table 1 provides a summary of the data.
appear to have a meaningful effect on findings: when both budget authority and expenditures are available distributional analysis has revealed similar levels of kurtosis across these measures.
We also proceed with some caution as to the reliability of the budgetary record during periods of authoritarian government. Authoritarian regimes are known to repress or alter information, which may compromise the integrity of any budget data that is made public. A symptom of this is inconsistency in the use of budget categories during the authoritarian periods (although we find that such reclassifications are also relatively common during periods of democratic rule). Categories are often redefined from one year to the next, which limits our ability to assess longitudinal changes in budgetary priorities. This is more problematic in Russia and Brazil in particular, where our data covers lengthy periods of authoritarian rule, and less so for Turkey, which sees only relatively brief military interventions during our period of study, and
Malta where the British kept accurate accounting records, known as 'Colonial Blue Books'. We do not claim that the data we assemble for the authoritarian periods is complete in the sense that it records every allocation made by these regimes; rather, only that it is the most complete account that can be compiled from public records. That being said, we have no reason to believe that authoritarian regimes systematically repress either very small or very large allocations; censorship should be neutral with respect to the shape of budget distributions, although this claim should be tested in future work. 9 We are also careful to only include those budget categories which are consistently defined between two years; that is, we exclude to the best of our ability from the analyses any budget changes which might reflect a shift in the definition of the stated budget category rather than a substantive reallocation. Having assigned Freedom House scores, we then calculate annual percent change values for each spending category. As discussed, there is some inconsistency across budget categories.
If a category had a change in its substantive definition in a certain year or was not reported, we do not calculate a percent change value for that year in that category. We also take a new approach to accounting for inflation. The data spans years of political and economic turmoil;
each country introduced at least one new currency or experienced a significant currency revaluation during our period of study. This makes inflation adjustments difficult and in many cases there is no consensus within the scholarly community about how such adjustments should be made. 11 Rather than adjusting for inflation prior to calculating percent changes (the standard approach in the literature), we calculate changes relative to total government growth in that year.
For example, if a budget category saw an annual increase of 10 percent and the total budget for that year grew by 7 percent, we consider that a 3 percent increase for that category in that year. If instead the budget category saw a 10 percent decrease, then that would be counted as a 17 decrease after factoring in overall budget growth. While atypical, this approach is both necessary given the historical context of our study and most importantly it preserves the essential element of the analysis, which is to assess how governments reprioritize problems. Crucially, it has no practical effect on the shape of the budget change distributions, which is our concern. It simply centres the change on an annual value of zero percent growth, whereas in fact the average growth could have been higher. As our concern is whether the shape is close to Normal or has high kurtosis, shifting the mean in this manner is not a concern. And it comes with the substantial advantage of allowing us to compare cases with wildly divergent currency values and inflation rates.
We pool percentage change values into distributions for each country and each Freedom
House score. The histogram bars simply represent the number of cases in which a given budget was changed by x percent, compared to its value in the previous year and the rate of overall government growth. Table 2 Table 1 confirms the visual evidence from the figures: budgeting is leptokurtic.
( Table 2 )
Evidence supports the information hypothesis rather than the institutional hypothesis in all three cases. In each country the transition toward greater freedom (and a more open system of government) corresponds with a drop in L-kurtosis, indicating a lower magnitude of punctuation during these periods. While the differences in L-kurtosis are only modest, they all point in the same direction. Furthermore, these findings are consistent with evidence presented by Lam and Chan (2015) that L-kurtosis is lower during periods of democratic governance. Collectively the results are compelling and suggest that democratic structures provide a powerful informational advantage, which conditions the policymaking process. 12 Note, however, that greater freedom is not so important as to outweigh other inter-country differences. For example, the budget distribution during the 'Not Free' period in Russia is still closer to the normal than the 12 The appendix replicates these findings for Brazil and Turkey after excluding periods of economic turmoil from the data. (For Russia, periods of economic upheaval are an approximate match to the periods of missing data.) A concern would be if budgetary instabilities correspond with economic distributions and that in turn these disruptions are more likely during authoritarian governance. We find that excluding these potentially problematic years does not substantively change the results. distribution for the 'Free' period in Turkey. Political freedoms are important, but we still have a long way to go in explaining budgetary patterns across countries. fully free country -and for most of the time covered, also a member of the European Union. In this way, we can replicate the study of the effect of transition to full democracy on the case of Malta. Figure 2 shows change distributions for these three periods. 
Colonial and independent Malta

Conclusion
A robust literature has now explored PE theory with regard to budgeting, but that literature has almost exclusively been focused on advanced industrial democracies, with some attention to subnational budgets (e.g., states, municipalities, and school districts) within these nations. Here we present just the second example of detailed attention to the shape of budgetary change in nondemocratic settings, building on the work of Lam and Chan (2015) and Chan and Zhao (2016) .
This focus has revealed systematic differences in the way that democracies and non-democracies process and respond to information. Studies of Western governments have taken findings of budgetary punctuations as evidence for the disproportionate processing of information by policymakers and we find that these punctuations are even more pronounced in the context of non-democracy. This suggest that when it comes to information processing and response, democratic governance has an advantage over more authoritarian forms.
We hope to expand on the analysis presented above, which must first start with more data collection in non-democratic systems, as well as exploring the various mechanisms democratic and authoritarian regimes use to gather information and act on it. In particular, as we collect 14 That the data are unbalanced in the sense that there is sometimes more data for the non-democratic periods (Russia, Brazil, and Malta) and sometimes more for the democratic periods (Turkey) should not affect the results. There are sufficient observations in each period to draw statistically meaningful distributions and thus any systematic differences in budgetary behaviour should reveal themselves.
more data from different types of regimes, it may be possible to pinpoint particular institutions or civil rights that affect the informational capacity of governments, and subsequently their decision-making processes. In addition, we hope to collect more nuanced data on other variables of interest -particularly economic instability -in order to exclude alternative explanations for distribution differences across regime types. We also note that there is great inter-state variation in the shape of budgetary change distribution -variation that a focus on political regimes appears insufficient in explaining. Ultimately we would hope to gain a better understanding of all factors -political, social, or economic -that affect the stability of government agendas. 
Tables
Budgetary Change in Authoritarian and Democratic Regimes
C. Descriptions of the Budgeting Process in Each Country
For reasons of space, we have not included in the main print-version of our article detailed descriptions of our data sources, as well as how the budgetary process works in each of the countries studied. We provide that information here. We do not investigate public budgeting during the period in which Brazil was drafting its new constitution or the first years after democratization (1986 to 1994) . The existing IBGE budget data for the period of 1986-1994 are not entirely reliable. For instance, Brown (2002) finds that the country's debt crisis led to accounting changes that render comparisons after 1987 very difficult. As indicated by our data set, this limitation is only circumvented with the establishment of the Real plan in 1994.
A. Data Sources and Descriptive Statistics
Altogether, the dataset has 105 different budget categories, which are all the categories reported in the IBGE and in the LOA data sets for both periods. The sum of budget categories reported for each year yields the total budget of each year. 19 While 105 categories existed during the time period of our study, not all categories exist in each year. Rather, categories vary across and within political regimes because the Brazilian government altered them throughout the years. 19 In order to calculate the total budget for each year, one needs to exclude the following categories: 10000 (Executive Branch), 30000 (Legislative Branch as reported in the authoritarian period) 30500 (Legislative Branch as reported in the democratic period), 50000 (Judicial Branch), and 90400 (Other expenses). These categories represent the sum of several subcategories, which are included separately and are therefore redundant.
These modifications occur in the democratic period because the president has the power to create, modify or extinguish ministries, secretaries, and public administration bodies through special legislation. To illustrate, the budget category that There is no missing data in Turkish spending figures for the period under examination.
Except some years in the late 1800s, allocated funds along with actual spending can be found at the BFC's website 21 and in Güran (2003) . Because the gaps were concentrated at the beginning of the time series, and also to avoid possible biases associated to the changeover between the old currency (scudo) and the 'new' one (pound sterling) that happened in 1826, we only used data starting from 1827. Expenditures data were recorded at a rather detailed level, and spending categories were relatively stable considering the long time covered. We counted 147 different categories that were used at least two consecutive times and were thus useful to calculate budget changes. 
Malta
B. Robustness Tests
Regime Classification
Concerns about the effect of regime-classification variation on the results reported in the article motivate us to pursue various robustness tests. If results consistently point in the same direction after multiple replications, this should lend greater credibility to our conclusions, even if certain concerns about data quality remain. In the article, we use Freedom House scores to separate authoritarian and democratic regimes. This appendix replicates our analysis using three alternative classification systems: Polity IV, Varieties of Democracy, and Unified Democracy Scores.
Polity IV codes 'the authority characteristics of states in the world system for purposes of comparative, quantitative analysis' (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2013) . Specifically, we use Polity IV codes corresponding to political competition. We have theorized that it is the electoral connection that provides leaders in democratic regimes with the incentive to seek out and engage with policy information, so it makes sense to look at political competition. Polity IV divides regimes into five levels of political competition: repressed, suppressed, factional, transitional, and competitive. Every year of available budget data for Russia corresponds with the 'transitional' period for political competition, offering no opportunity for comparison. Malta is not coded at all under Polity IV, so our replication looks at only Brazil and Turkey. Table A1 displays the kurtosis statistics corresponding to the distribution of changes associated with each level of political competition. 1971 -1972 1979 -1981 1996 -2004 350 208.26 0.779 Transitional 1973 -1978 1983 -1995 For both Brazil and Turkey, L-kurtosis decreases substantially moving from periods of low to higher political competition. This provides additional support for the informational advantage hypothesis. Political competition forces leaders to engage with policy information, as an administration that is unresponsive to shifting environmental challenges will be voted out of office.
The new 'Varieties of Democracy' (V-Dem) classification system offers measures of five principles of democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian) and these are disaggregated into a variety of variables measuring such things as judicial independence, electoral regularity, and gender equality (Coppedge et.al. 2015b) . From the V-Dem databank, we use a composite variable called the electoral democracy index, which captures Robert Dahl's institutions of polyarchy: freedom of association, suffrage, clean elections, elected executive, and freedom of expression (Coppedge et.al. 2015b) . Countries can receive scores of either 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, or 1, with higher scores indicating greater electoral accountability. The V-Dem codebook (Coppedge et.al. 2015a) suggests that the scores can be associated with 'closed autocratic,' 'autocratic,' 'ambivalent,' 'minimally democratic,' and 'democratic' regimes. Table   A2 shows the results of the distributional analyses using V-Dem's electoral democracy index to divide the data. If there are fewer than 100 observation associated with an electoral democracy score, that period is not included in the analysis over concerns about the reliability of distributions drawn from small datasets. (Malta is not rated by the V-Dem system and therefore not included in the table.) 2002-2003; 2004-2006; 2010-2012 438 37.70 0.497 Results are mixed. Brazil shows a dramatic reduction in kurtosis moving from a more autocratic to a more democratic period; evidence supportive of the informational advantage Finally, we use Unified Democracy Scores (U-Dem), which are estimated using Bayesian statistical models to create a general scale of democracy based on thirteen measures of regime type (Pemstein, Meserve, and Melton 2010) . The scale is continuous, ranging from -0.50 for the most autocratic regimes to 0.50 for the most democratic. We subdivide this continuous measure into four U-Dem quartiles so that we have enough observations in each quartile to draw change distributions. Table A3 shows the results of distributional analyses that group budgetary changes based on these quartiles. If there are fewer than 100 observations in a quartile we do not draw a distribution for that grouping of observations. By using the various classification systems, we gain consistent measures of the democratic tendencies of different regimes over time. But the historical span of these systems is limited and for Malta we have budget data from much further back in time than regimeclassification data is available. Furthermore, there are always some concerns about the accuracy of generalized classification systems. For these reasons, we replicate our analysis using regime transitions as the dividing points in the data. That is, we simply look at the historical record and note (to the best of our ability) the points at which one regime fell and was replaced by another. Table A4 shows the results. 1970 -1978 1982 -1995 1997 -2004 484 454.37 0.736 Military 1979 -1981 1996 For the most part, however, we still see a lower magnitude of punctuation during periods of greater political openness. Altogether, we have conducted sixteen tests of the hypotheses (across countries and classification systems) and twelve of these tests support the informational advantage hypothesis. So, while the results are not unequivocal, they point strongly in one direction and appear to reflect real differences in the abilities of democracies to process and act on information.
Economic analysis
Concerns about alternative explanations motivate us to engage in another robustness test. Brazil, Russia, and Turkey experienced economic instability during the periods analyzed in this paper.
Thus, we need to account for the possibility that it is economic instability, and not difference in regime type, that explains the kurtosis patterns we observe. This issue is less problematic for
Russia because the years of economic crisis are already excluded from our data set given our inability to compute spending change statistics for the 2008, 2009, and 2010 (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) , during which the country experienced oil shocks and debt crises; and the years of 1995, 1998, 1999, and 2001 , during which the country was hit by different financial crises ; Skidmore et al. [2010] ; Toshniwal [2012] ). Table A5 reports the results of this analysis using Freedom House scores: L-kurtosis still declines moving from partly free to free periods. In fact, results remain unaltered across multiple replications of this analysis using Polity IV, V-Dem, U-Dem scores and historical records. 1975-1985; 1996-1997 1970 -1972 1979 -1993 1995 -2004 718 439.80 0.710 Free 1973 -1978 
C. Descriptions of the Budgeting Process in Each Country
Russia
The political environment has varied considerably in post-Soviet Russia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the country experienced an unprecedented level of political competition, media freedom, and economic liberty. However, the concomitant collapse in state capacity meant that President Yeltsin's tenure, 1991-1999, was also marked by economic turbulence, threats to the territorial integrity of the federation, and 'feckless pluralism' (Carothers 2002: 10) Although Turkish politics faced three military interventions in two decades (1960, 1971 and 1980) , the role that the military played was categorized as 'moderator' and 'guardian' as these military regimes ended soon after the political authority was restored (Tachau and Heper 1983 1973-1978, free; and 1979-2004 again partly free. The latter period coincided with the rise of the Kurdish movement in the country: Turkey's treatment of its Kurdish citizens has been the main obstacle to the democratization of Turkish politics (Ergil 2000) . There are good reasons to expect that certain political and social groups were isolated from the decision-making process and their demands were not taken into consideration during this period.
Brazil
Our analysis focuses on the years of authoritarian rule , and, in the democratic period, the years of centre party rule (PSDB, 1995 (PSDB, -2002 (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) (1980) (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) was characterized by the dominance of the moderate group of military officers, economic crisis, and presence of social unrest.
The first period of the military regime was marked by the severe restriction of political and civil rights. The government interfered in almost all labour unions and civil society organizations, strikes were banned and student movements were declared to be extinct. Political rights were also suspended. The government established indirect elections for presidents and governors. Only two political parties were allowed to exist: the ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional), the regime party, and the MDB ( The first elected Council of Government was introduced with the 1849 constitution.
Maltese representatives were still a minority of the members, and suffrage was limited by sex, age, literacy, property, and income; which restricted the electorate to less than four percent of the population. In addition, while the Council had decision-making power, the Governor could override its deliberations. A new constitution granted in 1887 established a Legislative Council with a majority of elected Maltese representatives. However, the Governor could still veto or override its decisions, and while limitations to suffrage were relaxed, the electoral body was still restricted to five percent of the population. When the elected members took a confrontational stand against the colonial government, the constitution was revoked. free press, and a pluralistic party system, the first decades after independence were years of democratic consolidation. Its perfect two-party system, coupled with hyper-majoritarian political institutions (Carammia and Pace 2015) 
